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4 OCT 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with David Aaron,
3 October 1978

1. Aaron confirmed there will be an NSC meeting on Friday. He wants particularly to know the strengths and weaknesses of the positions of Rhodesian Patriotic Front front-line states.

a. Has the Patriotic Front really committed itself to a military solution or are they still willing to negotiate?

b. What game is Smith up to? Does he still put any hope in the internal solution?

c. Is there any prospect that the Rhodesian military could step in and oust Smith? Do they have the leadership potential? Do they have the inclination? Is this just wishful thinking that maybe Rhodesia will go back to being a British colony and we can forget about it?

Aaron also wants to know about the prospects in Namibia and a little on the prospects in South Africa.

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*(Sensitive items contained
in 2 separate "Copy Only" memos)*

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3. I complained that we weren't consulted on the proposed questions and answers to the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance and the fact that the action on this was given to OSD/PA. Aaron claimed he had a piece of paper that had Agency comments on this draft of the questions and answers. I'd like to know if we did clear it. Herb Hetu says he did not.

I also complained about Jody Powell's highlighting the President's statement. The claim was that there was such demand from the press that he had to amplify. I commented that we hadn't had any demands from the press on this subject at all.

4. Aaron expressed his concern that the Senate Select Committee is going to levy the charge that our ability to monitor SALT II was compromised by Kampiles. We must be ready to respond to this, and that is why there is the pressure for the damage assessment. (I made no commitments on the damage assessment.)

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6. I discussed the progress we are making on estimating what we can release on the Kampiles case. I told him that I would try to see the Attorney General on this next week, and that thereafter we should have an SCC meeting (Action--General Counsel).

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7. I delivered the letters on my standards for sensitive collection.

8. I cleared the DDCI's trip [REDACTED]

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9. I explained the status of the Jackson/Perle negotiations.

10. I received a copy of the President's decision on Title I.

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13. We discussed the Aspin/Boland meeting. I told him the status was that I was trying to find a simplified way of processing the clearances for covert actions under generic findings when they didn't have to go directly to the President. I thought this was a reasonable position that Aspin was taking and was trying to simplify the system.

14. I explained the status of our lobbying with the Congress on [REDACTED]

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16. Drop the SSCI Members' call on the President. It was implicit in the discussion I had on the SSCI's interest in SALT verification.

17. [REDACTED]

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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